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Abstract: The criteria for determining animal sentience proposed in the target article are
sensible but they lack an explicit functional justification for the focus on pain. This
commentary provides an abbreviated account of the most basic functional principles that
underpin animal sentience and articulates some minimal criteria for determining its presence.
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1. Introduction. It is difficult (if not impossible) to determine whether something is present
in an organism if we do not know what that ‘something’ is. To determine whether an organism
is conscious, therefore, we need to define what ‘consciousness’ is. There are two ways of
doing so: phenomenologically and functionally.
The most widely accepted phenomenological definition of consciousness is Nagel’s
(1974): “An organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to
be that organism – something it is like for the organism.” The difficulty with this definition
(when using it as a criterion for the presence of consciousness) is the insurmountable
‘problem of other minds’: only the organism itself knows whether or not there is ‘something
it is like’ to be it. This problem obliges us to use functional criteria instead.
In light of this problem, many neuroscientists declare ‘reportability’ to be the best
empirical criterion for determining the presence of consciousness (e.g., Naccache, 2021).
However, not only does this preclude non-verbal organisms, almost by definition, but it is a
remarkably weak criterion in itself. For example, it is easy to instantiate false reportability in
a zombie. That is presumably why, when one is required to demonstrate that one is not a
robot, e.g., on the internet, one is not asked to simply attest to the fact; instead, one is
required to successfully perform a mental task (usually a disambiguation task).
2. Beyond Reportability. Not surprisingly, therefore, Crump et al focus on functions other
than reportability; but the principles underpinning their selection are not explained. Why
focus so much on pain? Is it not conceivable that there might be something it is like to be an
organism which does not feel pain? Why is pain so special? In what sense does it differ from
vision, which – as we know -- readily goes on unconsciously?
The fundamental sense in which pain differs is that it is a variety of affective feeling as
well as being a variety of perception. Pain entails not only the perception of a particular type
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of stimulus but also the organism’s subjective response to that stimulus. Considerations such
as these led me recently to propose that a minimal functional definition of consciousness
should focus on raw feeling in general, rather than pain in particular (Solms & Friston, 2018,
Solms, 2019, Solms, 2021). This proposal was based not only on the logical fact that all feelings
are felt, by definition (‘unconscious feeling’ is an oxymoron), but also on the empirical fact
that the brain mechanisms of raw feeling are inextricable from the centrencephalic
mechanisms that sustain consciousness as a whole (see Solms, 2021, for review). In short,
feeling appears to be the elemental (and prerequisite) form of consciousness.
To illustrate the functional mechanism of feeling (i.e., what it does), Merker (2007)
used the example of air hunger. Respiratory control normally goes on unconsciously, until the
organism encounters unexpected situations (e.g., a carbon dioxide filled room) in which
respiratory reflexes cease to maintain blood gasses within their viable homeostatic bounds.
At this point, the need for oxygen (felt as air hunger, a.k.a. respiratory distress or suffocation
alarm) forcibly intrudes upon consciousness. Why? What does the feeling of your blood gas
balance add to their normal autonomic control? It adds the capacity for choice, which
underpins voluntary (as opposed to automatic) action. You have never been in a burning
building before, let alone this particular one, so you have no pre-existing means to maintain
your viable blood gas balance in these circumstances. Feeling provides the necessary basis for
selecting what to do; it tells you whether your selected action policy is leading to improving
or deteriorating conditions. Here, deteriorating blood-gas values (registered as increasing
feeling of suffocation alarm) predict imminent death, and improving ones (registered as
decreasing feeling of alarm, i.e., as relief) predict survival. So, feeling orients the organism’s
actions within the value system that underwrites all life, namely, that it is ‘bad’ to die and
‘good’ to survive. The crucial leap here is to recognise that these values apply, in any given
instance, only to and for the organism (to paraphrase Nagel). In other words, they are
inherently subjective. This is what licenses us to adopt the viewpoint of the organism.
In addition, feeling registers to and for the organism which of its many component
survival needs is currently the most salient. Homeostatic deviations cannot be reduced to a
common denominator. If 4/10 of air hunger could be added to 6/10 of thirst, say, to yield
10/20 of total need, then we could survive by drinking alone, which is patently not the case.
For this reason, an organism’s component needs must be treated as categorical variables, not
as continuous ones. And categorical variables are distinguished qualitatively. That is why
suffocation alarm feels different from thirst, which feels different, in turn, from pain, and so
on. This, I have argued (Solms, 2021), is the fundamental basis for qualia. This is what feeling
is for: it registers, to and for the organism (i.e., subjectively), how well or badly it is doing with
respect to a currently prioritised category of need (i.e., qualitatively). Through ‘felt
uncertainty’, the organism modulates its confidence in a current action policy, and changes it
as required, and learns from the experience.
3. Principled Minimal Criteria. On this basis, I propose the following minimal functional
criteria for determining the presence of feeling (in general, as opposed to air hunger, or pain,
etc., in particular):
(1) The organism must be alive; which need not imply that it possesses a brain or
nervous system (there are many other ways of transmitting and integrating
information in the service of goal-directed action). This criterion dictates only that the
organism will (on average) act in ways that ensure its continued existence.
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(2) The organism must have multiple component survival needs, each of which must
be satisfied in its own right, and it must have the capacity to prioritise those needs.
This criterion dictates that the organism’s needs will be treated as categorical
variables.
(3) The organism must have the capacity to satisfy its multiple needs – by trial and
error -- in unpredicted situations (e.g., novel situations), using voluntary behaviour.
This is the critical criterion. It is difficult to imagine how such behaviour can occur
except through subjective modulation of its success or failure within a phenotypic
preference distribution. This modulation, it seems to me, just is feeling (from the
viewpoint of the organism).
Less critical, but obviously adaptive, is:
(4) The organism must have the capacity to learn from such experiences. This is
Thorndike’s ‘law of effect’.
Also not critical, but equally adaptive, are:
(5) The organism must have the capacity to extend felt experience onto perception.
This implies a capacity to ‘feel like this about that’. Admittedly, it is difficult to
operationalise this criterion in terms of observable behaviour.
(6) The organism must have the capacity to plan; that is, to act voluntarily in virtual
realities, in addition to actual ones. This is the capacity for thinking, a.k.a. working
memory.
The last three criteria reflect the fact that consciousness admits of degrees. Not all conscious
organisms are equally conscious.

References
Crump, Andrew; Browning, Heather; Schnell, Alex; Burn, Charlotte; and Birch, Jonathan
(2022) Sentience in decapod crustaceans: A general framework and review of the
evidence. Animal Sentience 32(1)
Merker, B. (2007) Consciousness without cerebral cortex: a challenge for neuroscience and
medicine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30: 63–8.
Naccache, L. (2021) Is one spring enough for a conscious stream? Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 28: 000-00.
Nagel, T. (1974) What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83: 435–50.
Solms, M. (2019) The hard problem of consciousness and the Free Energy Principle.
Frontiers in Psychology, 10: 2714, doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02714
Solms, M. (2021) The Hidden Spring: A Journey to the Source of Consciousness. New York:
Norton.
Solms, M. & Friston, K. (2018) How and why consciousness arises: some considerations from
physics and physiology. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25: 202–38.

3

